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Katya Kozicki, Curitiba, Paraná/Brazil 
 
Human Rights and Justice in a Multicultural World 
 
We don’t have any right;  
it is always the other who has rights.” 
(Jankélévitch) 
 
Abstract: This paper intends to discuss some contemporary issues on human rights and democracy 
related to the concept of justice. Is the set of individual rights that is assumed by western democracies 
really universal? If so, how are they supposed to be interpreted? On the other side if  I take into 
account the “other” and pluralism in a serious way how to conciliate different concepts of justice? 
Taking Jacques Derrida’s approach of justice as its standpoint this paper aims to stress the difficulty 
to achieve a unique concept of justice as well as to think justice in the sphere of international law and 
the problem of ensuring human rights in the international order. Western democracies has becoming 
more and more multiethnic and multicultural and the set of rights that is at the center of the legal 
order has to be interpreted in a dialogical sense, one that assumes difference and plurality as its 
starting point. The plurality of conceptions of the good and the impossibility of establishing a unique 
concept of justice demands the re-creation of a democratic sphere where the dissent and the conflict 
could be experienced and, at the same time, the legal order needs to ensure individual and group 
rights against majority’s dictatorship. The main goal of this paper is to re-think the interpretation of 
law in a multicultural scenario in which it is not possible to have only one criteria of justice and 
difference and pluralism are envisaged are values themselves. 
Keywords: law; democracy; human rights; justice; deconstruction. 
 
Contemporary  societies  are  marked  by  contingency  and  differentiation,  which  hinder  the 
establishment of a single notion of the common good or the definition of unquestionable 
political goals. The democratic political project depends on the recognition of this openness of 
meaning for its viability. Although it is widely recognized that rational consensus and purpose 
cannot serve as the ends and means of political action, a degree of closure is necessary for 
democracy to be experienced. Total openness is not possible, as it risks compromising the 
basic  principles  that  constitute  political  society.  Openness,  contingency  and  mutual 
recognition are only possible if they originate from a common position that is somewhat 
closed and in which some rules are institutionalized. Different demands and opposing forces 
in society dictate the need for some decisions to be made and imply that some risks exist in  
2 
those decisions. It is precisely through the need to establish some degree of closure that the 
law plays an important role in enabling the achievement of human rights. In this way, law 
becomes an enabling instrument – or one of the instruments – of democracy. The argument 
explored in this paper takes as its premise the non-universalist ethics founded on the idea of 
alterity, where the other appears as a central category. The problem of the other (or the issue 
of alterity) was a central concern of the most important 20th Century philosophers. Probably 
one of the most important and thought-provoking reflections on the theme can be found in the 
work  of  Emmanuel  Levinas,  and  another  may  be  found  in  the  work  of  Jacques  Derrida. 
Although it is true that Derrida is used in many of Levinas' reflections, it is also true that the 
Derridian concept of alterity differs from Levinas’ perspective in some ways. If contemporary 
democracies are becoming increasingly multi-ethnic and multicultural, the perspective of the 
philosophy of difference can help build a non-universalist vision of human rights, where the 
other can be fully understood in all of his alterity. This understanding is also affirmed by the 
idea of justice as aporia, as formulated by Jacques Derrida. If justice cannot be understood 
within the law and its content cannot be precisely defined, how can any claim of universal 
ethics be sustained? 
 Based  on  the  work  of  Emmanuel  Levinas,  Derrida  considers  ethics  to  be  the  first 
philosophy (i.e., ethics as a relationship among people). Derrida's analysis approaches ethics 
from the perspective of responsibility, which takes language itself and its construction as a 
response to the other. The construction of political discourse and/or the construction of legal 
discourse must precede any decision or any form of mediation. Deconstruction reveals the 
dimension  of  responsibility  behind  these  constructions.  The  ethical  element  within  this 
formulation is the assumption of responsibility for the other. In this infinite and complete 
statement  of  alterity,  the  other  establishes  himself  in  all  of  his  alterity,  despite  the 
impossibility of comprehending this difference. 
 According  to  Levinas
1,  ethics  brings  into  question  the  freedom,  spontaneity  and 
subjectivity of the self and the other. For Levinas
2, justice defines and is defined by this 
ethical relationship with the other (i.e., in response to the suffering of the other), towards 
which the subject has an infinite responsibility. However, this ethical conception of justice is 
also consistent with a political notion of justice in the sense that all ethical relationships are 
always located in a particular socio -political context, which implies different ethical views 
and  leads  to  the necessity  of  choosing  among  them.  In  Totality  and  Infinity,  ethics  is 
understood as a relationship of responsibility, not a totalization of the other. The relationship 
                                                           
1 In this respect, see Simon Critchley,, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas, 1992. 
2 Emanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (Totalité et infini) 1990.  
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between the self and the other is a notably asymmetrical relationship of radical inequality.
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The transition from ethics to politics is characterized by the  arrival of a third party: a 
relationship  with  all  others
4.  The  relationship  with  the  other  is  a  close,  face -to-face 
relationship  of  responsibility  that  precedes  any  questioning.  Politics  has  the  important 
responsibility of questioning the existing order in  the sense that inquiry should relate to the 
search for a just community. Politics concerns the development of ethics, although there is a 
temporality or chronology in the interrelationship between ethics and politics in the sense that 
one precedes or follows the other because the ethical relationship occurs in a political arena. 
The arrival of this third party on the scene causes the political sphere to be opened up or 
brought to bear. That is, this arrival (of the third person) defines the transition from  ethics to 
politics in Levinas. At this point, the defining question, the question of justice itself, must be 
asked: "Who in this plurality is the other par excellence? How can I judge? How can others 
who  are  unique  and  incomparable  be  compared?"
5  This  journey  is  embodied  by  a 
transformation  in  the  type  of  relationship  in  question:  from  the  ethical  relationship 
characterized by complete difference/asymmetry to the political relationship characterized by 
reciprocity/equality among the members of society. The relationship of infinite responsibility 
between you and me (you / toi) does not imply reciprocity because my responsibility before 
the  other  does  not  assume  any  correspondence  (for  Levinas,  any  correspondence  or 
reciprocity  excludes  the  generosity  implied  in  the  idea  of  responsibility  and  renders  it 
instrumental or utilitarian). Here, the question of justice as a political problem arises, and 
from this issue, the question of law and politics arises: 
 
My search for justice assumes a new relationship in which the excess of responsibility that I must have 
before the other is subordinate to the question of justice. In justice, there is comparison, and the other 
has no privilege in relation to me. Among the people who enter this relationship, another relationship 
that assumes a comparison among them must be established (i.e., it assumes justice and citizenship). 
The limitation of that initial responsibility is that justice still implies a subordination of the self in 
                                                           
3 Levinas states the following: "In relation to the other, he appears to me as someone to whom I owe something, 
to whom I am responsible. Hence, there is asymmetry in the  I/You relationship, a relationship of complete 
difference between me and you, because the whole relationship with the other is a relationship of responsibility." 
Emmanuel Levinas. Alterity and transcendence. 1999, 101. 
4 "But the apparent simplicity and complete asymmetry of this relationship between me and you are disturbed by 
the arrival of a third person who appears alongside the other on his side. This third party is also the neighbor, the 
face, an unattainable alterity. Here, with this third person, we have the closeness of all men.” See Levinas (note 
3). 101, emphasis added. 
5 See Levinas (note 3). 102.  
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relation to the other. With the arrival of the third person, the fundamental problem of justice becomes 
the problem of law, which is always of the other.
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For Derrida, the appropriation of these views is also revealed as a political perception of 
justice in the sense that justice involves the idea of political change and openness to a future 
that can induce change. The idea of  justice as the experience of what  cannot be decided 
(undecidable
7) is what renders the subject political (and legal),  given the necessity of the 
decision. The moment of judgment encompasses the transition from the undecidable to the 
decision (i.e., the transition from an ethical experience of justice into political action). How 
can this judgment be performed, and what is  the content of this political action? In Derrida, 
the answer is always found in the present or in some specific form of political action. Justice 
should be the guide or the critical element, but it can never be brought into the present. As an 
element of political action, justice is marked by the symmetry among parties at the point 
within the polis space in which they are all subjects or citizens. On this note, Derrida writes 
the following:  
 
A deconstructive approach to politics based upon the radical separation of justice from law; 
and the non-instantiability of the former within the latter, leads to what one might call the dis-
embodiment  of  justice,  where  no  state,  community  or  territory  could  be  said  to  embody 
justice.  One  might  say  that  the  ‘experience’of  justice  is  that  of  an  absolute  alterity  or 
transcendence that guides politics without being fully present in the publice realm.
8  
 
Moreover, to view rights and struggles as being the same is to reaffirm pluralism and 
difference continually, to recognize the possibility of conflict and to view democracy as a way 
of organizing society instead of a mere form of government. The grammar of the democratic 
game requires knowledge of the constitutive rules of a community. Rules can only be read 
and learned from within the framework of a particular tradition, with the help of the concepts 
provided by this tradition. Likewise, what is legitimate and illegitimate or right and wrong 
will always be unique to this tradition (i.e., historically and socially contextualized within this 
tradition). These factors allow us to think of man as embedded in his own history, and it is 
only through that history that the world makes itself known. Only within specific traditions 
                                                           
6 See Levinas (note 3) 102.  
7"Undecidable is the name of intractable dilemmas that occur in completely determined circumstances. However, 
undecidability refers not only to the fundamental  aporias within a discourse but also to the requirement for a 
constitutive decision that articulates social meanings in one sense or the other." Jacob Torfing, New theories of 
discourse. Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999,  307.  
8 See S. Critchley. Derrida: private ironist or public liberal?,  in: Deconstruction and pragmatism,, 1996, 36.  
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can human rights be analyzed and defined. The definition and interpretation of what these 
rights will be is always part of a particular historical and social context. Therefore, human 
rights  discourse  must  always  be  problematized  in  specific  contexts.  Although  this  work 
adopts the idea of non-universalist ethics, it also assumes that democracy is a privileged space 
for the achievement of these rights. Thus, this work seeks to interweave reflections on alterity 
and human rights with reflections on democracy. 
As  previously  stated,  within  this  perspective,  justice  and  democracy  are  what  might 
happen
9. The disembodiment or depersonalization of justice can best be represented by 
democracy, as democracy also represents the disembodiment or depersonalization of power 
and the separation of the body of the principle fr om the state/sovereignty. In this sense, 
democracy is the political form that most appropriately represents this perspective on justice. 
This perspective assumes that political action occurs but is not confined to it. This perspective 
is not contained with in the limits of the judicial system but assumes that the law is a 
stabilizing element that prioritizes the moment of decision (or rather, of judgment). In other 
words, the law is assumed to be an ethical commitment. This democracy can be signified by 
the  endless search for justice and represented by a commitment to the other. This form 
represents  the  radicalization  of  democracy,  which  is  understood  as  the  deepening  of 
democratic relations. This plural democracy can recognize the other in all of his fullnes s and 
can look beyond reason to grasp the importance of passion as the driving force of human 
actions.  
To think of democracy, one must think about who its subjects are and how they are 
positioned in the so -called political community. The subject of libera l democracy in its 
current form is not the same as the subject of a radically democratic society.  
The idea of  citizenship is closely related to the idea of  rights and obligations (i.e., the 
citizen is entitled to rights and has obligations in the poli tical sphere). However, the idea of 
rights is much more privileged than that of obligations in liberal ideology. The liberal citizen 
is conceived in the abstract and almost in isolation from the political community of which he 
or she is a member. Within this perspective, the citizen is considered an individual holder of 
universal rights. The old notion of citizenship, which is founded on the ideal of political 
participation,  stressed  the  obligations  of  individuals  as  active  members  of  a  political 
community and also emphasized the ancient notion of freedom. In contrast, the liberal citizen 
is related to the political community in the sense that the community, as a whole, should be 
able to protect its rights against the state and other individuals. In this perspective, citizenship 
                                                           
9 See Jacques Derrida, Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism, (note8)  77-88. 
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acquires a passive connotation rather than an active one. The rights of individuals depend on 
the community, but this relationship is conceived from an instrumental view (i.e., the political 
community is the instrument used to achieve and protect individual rights). The rights of 
individuals are protected by law, which must be applied by the state. In liberal thought, there 
is no concern about the individual's participation in the development of civic virtues or the 
formation of community standards and values. In this view, what matters above all is the legal 
status of the individual rights holder. 
Membership in the political community implies acceptance of a specific language of 
civic relations, which is the res publica. The common thread is a substantive notion of the 
public interest instead of the common good. In turn, this interest is defined and composed of 
the interrelationships among the various social actors. The public interest also depends on 
numerous  factors  that  determine  this  mode  of  interrelationship  and  can  thus  only  be 
considered and defined based on the specific conditions within a particular historical context. 
In other words, given the historical and concrete nature of the public interest, it can always be 
defined and redefined in a process of continuous reconstruction. 
Citizenship can never be understood without also understanding that the relationships 
that exist within a public space are composed of political actions that are always exercised 
within an atmosphere of conflict and antagonism. In this perspective, the political always 
addresses the construction of a "we" as opposed to a "they." This dimension of antagonism, 
which is characteristic of the political, involves the establishment of a boundary that separates 
“us” from “them”. Applied politically, this conflict implies the acceptance of others and of 
difference. The other does not share the same values or ideals as the self but shares the mutual 
recognition  of  everyone’s  right  to  hold  vastly  different  expressions  and  positions.  The 
demarcation of this  border and its  recognition  also  enable the construction of a common 
identity, which is generated in the we/they dialectic. By contrast, if the conflict cannot be 
managed in the sphere of political action, the conflict might lead the community to conceive 
the other as an enemy or as someone to be destroyed such that the identity of the community 
is not lost. This border is constructed because of adherence to ethical-political community 
principles, which lead to the exclusion of those who do not share them. The community is 
constitutive of the notion of citizenship. Identification with the "we" enables the individual to 
be recognized as a citizen.  
Conflict, antagonism, division and incompleteness are not temporary obstacles to the 
realization of ultimate harmony in democratic societies. On the contrary, these elements are 
always present in any democracy because they are constitutive of the term’s meaning, which  
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implies that agreements, principles, values and possible identifications are always provisional. 
The concept of citizenship is ultimately linked to the necessary ideas of freedom in the private 
sphere and equality in the public sphere. However, these two principles cannot be perfectly 
balanced against or reconciled with each other.  
The impossibility of complete consensus or of a final agreement indicates the deepening 
of democracy instead of its negation. By improving the instruments of political participation 
and political decision making and by seeking ways to strengthen social bonds, communities 
strive for the unattainable: democracy. However, this striving gives democracy its meaning in 
the sense that democracy  requires  invention and constant  reinvention  and is  an endlessly 
dynamic force. Politics exists because there is always a need for decision making. In turn, 
decisions need to be made because the political is marked by conflict and antagonism. Perfect 
and lasting stability would represent a denial not only of the political and of politics but also 
of democracy itself.   
There are no precise, pre-established ways by which a community can obtain the balance 
between identification and the cohesion required for democracy or between empowerment of 
the individual and the respect for difference required by liberal pluralism. This balance will 
never  be  perfect  or  stable  and  will  always  be  subject  to  new  articulations.  Because  this 
balance can manifest itself in an infinite number of ways, it cannot be reduced to a final 
solution.  
Ethics becomes politics. The responsibility demanded by the recognition of the other is 
infinite. The experience of alterity is impossible and can never be fully captured. Justice and 
democracy  cannot  be  achieved  in  the  present  and  will  always  remain  something  to  be 
achieved. Nonetheless, even if justice only ever exists in the future and if politics, based on a 
deconstructionist reading, signifies a space for the undecidable, we cannot refuse to search for 
a way to resolve this impossibility, particularly for the achievement of human rights. 
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